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WHEN IS A SUICIDE COMPENSABLE UNDER A
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE?
RALn' S. BAUER*

T

HE facts on which the question of compensation for a suicide under a
workmen's compensation statute arise are, in broad outline, as follows: the

employee, after receiving injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment, finding convalescence slow or difficult, commits suicide. In some of these
cases, the facts indicate with sufficient clearness that he had, at the time of
killing himself, complete control over his actions, or, to put it another way, that,
at the time, his acts were volitional. In other cases, the facts seem to indicate
clearly enough that he was, at the time of the suicide, so completely insane as to
have no volition. In some of this latter class of cases, the clearly indicated insanity has, as one of its manifestations, an uncontrollable impulse to commit
suicide.
Here, as in all other fields in which human conduct is to be judged by more or
less uncertain and relative standards and not by set rules, and in which there is
often comparative uncertainty as to what the facts really are, there naturally
exists a considerable border-land of cases of which the final disposition is hardly
predictable. Probably the disposition of a close case by the board is less easily
predictable than is the result of an appeal to the courts from an award or a refusal of an award by the board, for, in such a case, the court is likely to follow
the finding of facts by the board, just as in a common law case it would follow
the finding of facts by the jury if there is some evidence to sustain the finding.
The key to the situation seems to be in the question whether the decedent exercised volition in committing suicide, and this should be true, whether the
formula used in a particular case emphasizes as essential to recovery non-volition or insanity or an uncontrollable impulse. Insanity is important only as it
destroys the power of true volition to die and therefore makes it a fact that decedent's suicide was not a volitional act. An uncontrollable impulse is important
only as a driving force that has impelled the decedent into the suicidal act without the exercise of any true volition. Looking at the different formulae in the
abstract, one might come to the conclusion that whether proof of non-volition
of the decedent or of uncontrollable impulse or of both is stated as a requisite of
claimant's case, in the great majority of cases, probably would make no difference; but, inasmuch as a general state of non-volition in the mind, especially in
a well developed case of insanity, is a thing often so distinctly evidenced by objective manifestations as to be fairly susceptible of proof, while an uncontrollable impulse is likely to be a thing so strictly subjective as to give little or no
objective manifestation prior to the suicidal act and therefore likely to be unsusceptible of proof, probably a formula directly making volition the pivotal
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point upon which to decide the case is preferable to a formula making the case
turn upon uncontrollable impulse. It is of course true that the very reason for
talking about uncontrollable impulse is that the suicide upon uncontrollable
impulse is not a volitional suicide; but, because of the subjective approach
through the "uncontrollable impulse" formula, it would seem that industrial
boards may find it more difficult to justify in their own minds an award to the
claimant under this formula than under the formula stressing volition. It may
be comparatively easy to adduce some objective proof that the decedent was so
insane that he was incapable of entertaining any volition, so that there is some
proof to sustain an award; but it may be somewhat more difficult to find any
proof that the decedent actually had an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, for the fact of uncontrollable impulse lies in the field of the subjective,
which is not so easily penetrable by proof.
In general, in workmen's compensation cases, courts seem inclined to follow
loosely, with perhaps a greater liberality to plaintiff, the general principles of
the common law as to causation and of inclusion of damage within or exclusion
from the operation of the rule of law invoked by the plaintiff, just as they have
done in cases brought under wrongful death statutes.'
In one case,2 a board's award of compensation for suicide was permitted by
I Daniels v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424, 62
L.R.A. 751 (x903), is a wrongful death case in which recovery was refused because the uncontroverted evidence tended to show that decedent "with deliberate purpose, planned to take his
own life," that he had "an understanding of the physical nature and effect of his act," and that
he had a "willful and intelligent purpose to accomplish it." This case is often cited and followed in workmen's compensation cases. See Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, i8o N.E. 231
(1932).

Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1922).
For a criticism of Sinclair's Case, see article by the present writer, Suicide as Intervening
Cause in Workmen's Compensation Cases as Compared with Suicide in Cases of Wrongful
Death, 5 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 228 (1925). See also article, Comment on Professor Bauer's
Article, Causation and Suicide, by Professor John E. Hannigan, 5 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 233.
In the original article at p. 231 the writer has said: "There seems to be no reported case in
which the recovery has been allowed under a wrongful death statute, where so clearly volitional
a suicidal act intervened as in Sinclair's Case. But, when one considers the purposes of the
workmen's compensation acts and the tendency of courts not to apply strictly the common
rules of proximate cause to these cases, it is not surprising that compensation is awarded in
some cases in which the chain of causal connection seems weak. However, it is submitted that
the opinion in Sinclair's Case goes much farther than the purposes of workmen's compensation
acts justify. According to the report of the case, the evidence tends to show that the deceased
committed suicide by intelligent, understanding, slow, and deliberate self-starvation. This
was not an unconscious or involuntary act induced by the injury that had occurred in the
course of his employment. Can the purposes of these statutes include compensation for death
under such circumstances? The purposes of these statutes are social and economic. The primary
social and economic purpose is to make happier and economically more stable the condition of
the worker. Secondarily, it is purposed that this betterment of conditions will lead to greater
efficiency in laborers. With these purposes in view it is deemed just to compel an industry to
pay, as a part of its current expenses, compensation for such injuries as arise out of and in
1

COMMENT

the court to stand, in the face of the finding by the board that decedent had refused food during a long period and had finally starved himself to death. Here,
apparently, was a clear case of volitional suicide; but this is not the usual disposition of such cases, and the same court has recently seemed to evince a
change of heart without any allusion whatever to its earlier aberration from the
beaten path.3
In a recent case in the New York Appellate Division,4 the court said:
"The Industrial Board has found, upon competent supporting evidence, that
the deceased employee, as the result of accidental injuries sustained by him in
course of the employment. It is submitted that no purpose of the act is served by granting compensation in such a case as Sinclair's. The assurance to the laborer that his dependents will
receive compensation if he consciously and willfully starves himself to death after an injury, is
not such a comfort to him as to increase his happiness or his deficiency; nor does it seem economically sound to compel an industry to pay for a willful suicide of an employee."
At p. 237 in Professor Hannigan's article referred to above, the following interesting queries
are put: "May not a court, taking man as he is, permit a jury to consider the deprivation of or
injury to his normal understanding or will power, resulting from a physical injury, as analogous
to a progressive condition which may be the cause of further development of injury? The will
to live, the will to resist evil suggestion; the power to fight against despair,-are they anything
more than shields, powers of protection? When a man is wrongfully deprived of them, are not
the consequences of such deprivation fairly in the chain of causation?"
The late Dean James Parker Hall, in a letter dated December 23, 1925, addressed to the
present writer, in regard to the above-mentioned article on "Suicide as Intervening Cause in
Workmen's Compensation Cases," said: "I agree with your conclusion, which is also supported by the Scotch case of Malone v. Cayer, Irvine & Co., 45 Sc. L.R. 351. When the employee commits suicide when so insane, as to have no real volition, I agree that the Compensation Act should apply. Otherwise I do not think his death was in its policy. I should disagree
with the Scheffer Case [Scheffer v. Washington City, etc. St. Ry. Co., 1o 5 U.S. 249, 26 L. Ed.
1070 (i88i), a wrongful death case], assuming the insanity there to deprive the injured person
of his volition." Dean Hall seems to have considered volition or non-volition the proper test.
On the whole, it would seem that no better test can be found, either in the cases of wrongful
death or in those of workmen's compensation.
3 Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, i8o N.E. 231 (1932). Here the employee received an injury December 3o, 1929, and was paid compensation until his death. He died January 2o,
x930. His widow claimed compensation for his death. The Industrial Accident Board found
that the employee met his death by jumping from a bridge into the Connecticut river, and that
his death was causally connected with conditions due to his injury, and awarded compensation.
The superior court entered a decree whereby it ruled that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the death was "causally related to any injury arising in and out of the course of his
employment," and dismissed the claim. The supreme judicial court affirmed the decree of the
superior court, saying: "The testimony above recited and the other evidence in the case, though
tending to show that the employee's mind was disordered when he committed suicide, did not
warrant a finding that he took his own life 'through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium
of frenzy without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of his act.'" Without mention of Sinclair's Case, supra, note 2, the court here reverts to the earlier tests of uncontrollable impulse and non-volition, used in Sponatski's Case,
22o Mass. 526, io8 N.E. 466, L.R.A. i9x6A, 333 (i95).
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his employment, became insane, due to which insanity he committed suicide as
the result of an uncontrollable impulse and without conscious volition, and that
said death unavoidably resulted from the said accidental injuries. There is,
therefore, nothing to sustain appellants' contention of lack of causal relation between the injuries and death."
In a Vermont case,S the court said:
"It is held that when the insanity resulting from an accident ends in a suicide
which is the result of an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy, and
without conscious volition to produce death having knowledge of the physical
consequences of the suicidal act, there is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the accident and the death, and compensation therefor is to be
awarded. But when the suicide is the result of a voluntary, willful choice, with
knowledge of the purpose and physical effect of the act, a new and independent
agency intervenes, breaks the chain of causation, and compensation is to be
denied. In compensation cases, the rule is the same as in negligence cases, as is
shown by the Sponatski Case." 6
To a great extent, workmen's compensation decisions in general seem to be
swayed by general common law principles of "causation" and of "intervening
cause," 7 and it is only natural that this should be as true of suicide cases as it is
of cases of personal injuries to claimant. There are, however, some noticeable
deviations from those principles.8
sMcKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 1oo Vt. 45, 134 At. 640 (1926).
6 Supra, n.3.

7InBaker v. State Industrial Commission, 128 Ore. 369, 274 Pac. go (1929), the court, in
allowing compensation, follows substantially one of the formulae of proximate cause often recited in the decisions of negligence cases. See also Polucha v. Landes, 6o N.D. 159, 233 N.W.
264 (ig3o); and Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 220, 284 Pac. 313
(1929).

8In some of the cases in which compensation has been allowed it seems that, either as to
causation'or as to certainty of proof, courts have been much less rigid in their requirements of
plaintiffs than at common law. In Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 207 Conn. 56, 139 At. 644,
56 A.L.R. 455 (1927), claimant's decedent, a young woman, was a librarian employed by defendant. She worked very hard as librarian and put much additional strain upon herself by
work as president of the State Library Association and for conventions. These outside activities
were for the purpose of benefiting the library and herself. Through overwork, she became insane and committed suicide. The decedent was subject by heredity to a predisposition of mental trouble. The commission had reached the conclusion, based on facts, that the death arose
out of and in the course of her employment. This conclusion was sustained by the trial court
and the supreme court. When one considers the uncertainty of proof of the causal relation in
the case as reported, one wonders whether any such result would have been reached in an action
brought under a wrongful death statute for negligently causing death of a decedent, a type of
case in which the courts more certainly and consistently follow common law principles of causation.
In Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Peters, 3 S.W. (2d) 568, 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), the court
held that a petition for compensation for death of an employee was not demurrable because it
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To allow recovery of compensation for a clearly volitional suicide would seem
to be going beyond the purpose of the workmen's compensation statutes, and it
would probably encourage suicide in some cases. Furthermore, it would be an
interesting question whether a statute in terms allowing compensation for volitional suicide would be constitutional.
Whatever formula is used, it would seem that the key to workmen's compensation cases in which the claimant seeks compensation for suicide is to be found
in the question, "Did the claimant's decedent commit suicide without any real
volition, as a result of an injury that is compensable under the statute?"
failed to allege that the accident was the proximate cause of the death, where the petition
showed by clearest inference that the injuries sustained were the efficient, exciting, or contributory cause of death.

